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WHAT GOOD ARE THE ARTS? By John Carey, Faber and Faber, London: 
2005, pp. xii + 286 
 
John Carey’s book is a marvelous read. It is beautifully written, the argument is 
lucid, it assembles some fascinating evidence and calls for debate on one of the few 
social topics on which practitioners and philosophical thinkers tend to speak the 
same language. I learned much from the book; I also disagreed with quite a bit of it. 
But Carey has provided such a useful service that criticism must be continuing the 
argument, not trying to undermine it. 
 
Carey means to debunk several myths, including the idea that there is some 
essence or set of criteria that identifies what is art. He argues that attempts to 
identify a sub-set of ‘genuine’ artworks are premised on the assertion that one 
person’s feelings are more valuable than another’s. Carey dismisses this, arguing 
we cannot know another person’s feelings and that in any case, ranking feelings in 
terms of their value is arbitrary: ultimately, just a matter of how you feel. Art, Carey 
thinks, is just what the individual thinks to be art (question: do people—including 
ordinary members of the public looking at an exhibition—think that judging artworks 
is judging people’s feelings? Carey does not consider ontology of art; in fact, 
the opening of the book implies that realism here—and in ethics—would have to be a 
‘religious’ matter). 
 
If Carey is right, we cannot rank art at all as art, which I find hard to square with 
our ideas and practices of artistic growth and development. For example, I know a 
composer who moved from writing pleasant, derivative tunes to developing an 
independent and quite revolutionary voice. I can describe this change best in terms 
that are neither purely factual nor simple reflection of my own feelings: I can best 
discuss his growth and improvement as a creative artist within the terms of the art of 
music. Carey would presumably try to reduce the musicology here, like the artworks 
themselves, to fact or to taste. He is a nominalist about art: there are no universals, 
only individual artworks made so by individuals’ reactions and decisions. He does 
not offer a theoretical argument: true nominalist, he simply says without criticism 
‘this is what has happened: people now call ‘‘art’’ whatever they feel like.’ 
He does not take a position on whether someone can describe something as art 
without first having a concept or idea of art. He might say that the concept of art too 
is personal—which may be true in the sense that it is personal to me, my concept, but 
hardly in the sense that its content is entirely personal to me. We hold the concepts 
we do because of our beliefs about the truth, not because we feel like holding these 
concepts. Anyone who says they ‘just feel like’ holding a certain concept of art, or of 
anything else, isn’t accurately and fully describing what they do when they think 
conceptually. 
 
Carey is strongly empiricist (p. 174: ‘we cannot talk of truth and falsehood except 
where proof is available . . .’). He calls often—and often rightly—for evidence, tests, 
surveys before we can make claims about what ‘people’ think about art. But 
individuals are rarely the (sole) authorities for their own responses. We can’t settle 
complex issues just by piling up testimonial evidence. What matters too is the 
thinking and reasons behind people’s testimonies—the meaning of this evidence— 
and this calls for careful, including non-empirical, analysis. Carey may well have 
demonstrated that we lack today a theory of art that is popularly acceptable, yet 
people (me, for one) may still react as if we do have this theory, or at least could 
have. Perhaps a good theory of art is still to be sought; perhaps it exists elsewhere 
than in the enlightenment and post-enlightenment aestheticians Carey reviews. 
Ch. 2 explores recent views that fashion, gardening and other familiar activities are 
art; or rather, that the category of art should be dropped in favour of a broader class 
of activities we find special, enthralling, encouraging. Since all such activities must 
serve our evolutionary needs, football or fashion may be more valuable than 
Poussins or symphonies. But humans have other than evolutionary needs—reason 
means we can transform or extend our evolutionary inheritance from mere survival 
into an interest in the potentially infinite questions of knowledge, action and appreciation. 
Art that satisfies these more cerebral needs can also benefit the activities that 
connect us more directly with survival: thus gardening and fashion may benefit from 
the content of traditional arts as well as explain the roots of these arts. Perhaps it is 
the interplay between developed art and natural practices that makes gardening 
more than subsistence, fashion more than attracting a mate, football more than 
hunting raids. If so, the high-versus-popular-art debate does not reflect the reality, 
whether one takes Carey’s position within that debate or not. 
 
A major feature of Carey’s book is advocacy for participatory, hands-on art 
defined against power-house, showcase art. But these can co-exist, as they surely 
must: without the Jessye Normans and Yehudi Menuhins the profile of art, standards 
of art teaching, crafting of instruments to the highest level, ability and capacity 
of people to articulate the importance of art within prisons and other deprived 
communities, would all suffer. What happens if a prisoner encouraged to express 
through art his need for social inclusion turns out to be the next Placido Domingo? 
We then have ‘power-house’, quality art, and he now needs and deserves training, 
work, colleagues, professional advice, opportunities, variety of repertoire all of the 
highest caliber. It is naı¨ ve to think there would be people to inspire prisoners to put 
on Macbeth—or would be Macbeth in 2005—were there not drama schools, a culture 
of theatre, recognition and remuneration for writers and actors, a range of opportunities 
at different levels. 
 
Carey questions the idea that art makes us better people. His discussion here is 
original and his case that participatory art helps and improves people is strong. But I 
think the link between quality art and goodness deserves more attention. Good 
philosophical work on creativity, imagination and choice is available, as well as 
the cant Carey rightly dismisses. Also, the art/religion connection, which Carey only 
touches on, deserves investigation. Anyone with a knowledge or history of religious 
experience, anyone even moved often to prayer, takes part in an experience that is 
creative, appreciative and serious, and that means it includes aesthetic experience. It 
is absurd to think subscribing to the local rep makes you a better person. But it can 
help tutor emotion in busy people and sensitise us to deeper thinking on the world 
and our contemporary inadequacies; the psychological and social analysis of why it 
does not inevitably do so is but one half of the matter. 
 
Part II argues that alone of the arts literature can coherently and intelligently 
criticise itself. This is complicated: only literature can make criticism (that is itself 
literature) of literature, but surely only music can make criticism (that is itself music) 
of music. There are examples a-plenty of (intentionally) anti-music music, antipainting 
painting etc. Carey thinks (p. 177) that literature is the only art that can 
criticise anything, at all. This is because of its relation to reasoning. It’s true that only 
persons can argue, and argument is using words, but what is special about literature 
is that it makes art out of argument’s tools—words—not that it is closer to reason. 
Literature seems no closer (whatever that means) to reason than dance which uses 
the human medium of argument—the body—to make art, or music which uses its 
very freedom from argument to express structure and order more directly. Carey also 
argues only literature can moralise, which I find simply wrong: what about the Pieta? 
Shostakovich’s symphonies? Mime? 
 
Carey believes all literature has an indistinctness which empowers the reader to 
exercise imagination. He reminds us we may well disagree with him here, but that 
this is expected since his thesis is the importance of subjective judgement and 
personal response. This is unconvincing (if you accept my view, you prove my thesis; 
if you reject it, you prove my thesis). In fact, since Carey’s thesis on literature 
depends on his own interpretation of literary examples, if we do not agree with 
these interpretations, we have been given little reason to accept the thesis. His claims 
for literature over the other arts can be hard to credit: musicians and others would 
probably be puzzled about the allegedly unique ways in which we can make literature 
our own and use it imaginatively. I also find heavy-handed the argument that art 
makes no truth-claims which is why very different conflicting artworks can co-exist 
while conflicting scientific theories cannot. Perhaps instead art’s special relation to 
truth is expressive: an infinity of different expressions of truth can evidently co-exist 
though an infinity of different (scientific) propositions about truth cannot. 
This book deeply interested me, particularly in its assembly of recent studies from 
different fields. It also left me wishing that distinctions between performance art and 
other art, writing and literature, words and music and so on had been teased out in 
Part II which makes some very bold claims. My strongest response by far is conviction 
that Carey is right about participatory art, but disappointment that with some 
cheap shots at Covent Garden he has dismissed what quality art means and what it 
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